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A STATUTE IN PARTICULARLY SERIOUS 
NEED OF REINTERPRETATION: THE 
PARTICULARLY SERIOUS CRIME 
EXCEPTION TO WITHHOLDING  
OF REMOVAL 
Abstract: Withholding of removal provides that a deportable alien may 
avoid removal if she can show that it is more likely than not that her life 
or freedom will be threatened if she is removed to a particular country. 
Aliens are not eligible for withholding of removal, however, if they are 
found to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime as defined by 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Although Congress provided a per se defi-
nition of a particularly serious crime in the statute, the majority of U.S. 
courts of appeals have held that immigration judges can also declare 
crimes that do not fit this statutory definition to be particularly serious. 
This Note argues that the majority interpretation is incorrect and that the 
minority interpretation, which only allow crimes that fit the statutory 
definition to be declared particularly serious, is correct. This Note addi-
tionally argues that a further finding that an alien poses an ongoing dan-
ger to the community should be required before an alien is denied with-
holding of removal. 
Introduction 
 Mrs. Oyenike Alaka, a citizen of Nigeria and a member of the Yo-
ruba tribe, received permanent resident status in the United States 
through amnesty on December 1, 1990.1 Ten years after becoming a 
permanent resident, Mrs. Alaka returned to her native Nigeria and 
married Ade Bola Fashola on March 1, 2001.2 Ade Bola Fashola owned 
a complex of stores and shops.3 All of these stores, as well as his house, 
were located on the same block in Abutemetta, Nigeria.4 Ade Bola 
                                                                                                                      
1 Alaka v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 456 F.3d 88, 91–92 (3d Cir. 2006). 
2 Petitioner’s Brief in Support of Her Appeal at 7, Alaka, 456 F.3d 88 (No. 05-1632). 
Because the court did not reach the merits of Alaka’s persecution and torture claims, it did 
not provide a detailed description of her experiences in Nigeria. See Alaka, 456 F.3d at 92. 
The court did, however, outline her travails there in general terms that are in accord with 
the Petitioner’s Brief, albeit in far less detail. See id. 
3 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 2, at 11. 
4 Id. 
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rented one side of the block to members of the Yoruba tribe and the 
other to Ibo and Hausa tribesmen.5 The Odua People’s Congress 
(“OPC”), a Yoruba tribal organization attempting to control the Yoruba 
sections of Nigeria, violently objected to Ade Abola’s renting shops to 
non-Yoruba tribesmen.6 It objected so strongly that its members se-
verely beat him twice.7 The first time, they beat him with large bats, 
leaving him hospitalized for a month.8 The second time, Mr. Abola’s 
tormentors beat him while brandishing pistols.9 Mrs. Alaka witnessed 
both of these beatings, as did her children.10 Fearing for their safety 
after the second attack, Mrs. Alaka immediately placed her children on 
a flight back to the United States and followed them two months later 
when she could afford to do so.11 
 Upon returning to the United States on August 8, 2001, Mrs. Alaka 
was detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”).12 
In 1992 she had been convicted of aiding and abetting bank fraud, and 
the INS denied her admission because of this conviction.13 Mrs. Alaka 
sought withholding of removal, a form of relief for refugee aliens who 
would otherwise be deported to their home country, by testifying to the 
persecution and torture that she could face if forced to return to Nige-
ria.14 The immigration judge (“IJ”) found Mrs. Alaka’s testimony to be 
credible and determined that her experience in Nigeria could support 
a finding of persecution on the basis of political opinion.15 Thus, it 
would have been inappropriate to return Mrs. Alaka to Nigeria as doing 
                                                                                                                      
5 Id. 
6 Alaka, 456 F.3d at 92. 
7 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 2, at 11. 
8 See id. at 12. 
9 Id. at 13–14. 
10 Id. at 12, 14. It was also common for the OPC to drive by the house in the middle of 
the night and scream threats. See id. at 13. 
11 See id. at 14. 
12 Alaka, 456 F.3d at 92–93. 
13 Id. at 92. Mrs. Alaka was convicted on one count, sentenced to eight months incar-
ceration and three years supervised release, and was required to pay $4,716.68 in restitu-
tion. Id. She also had two convictions and incarcerations outside of the United States. Id. 
She was convicted once in France for a drug-related offense, for which she was sentenced 
to approximately one and a half years incarceration, and once in Canada for fraud and 
unlawful possession and use of a credit card, for which she received a three month sen-
tence. Id. The U.S. government, however, was unable to produce a record of conviction for 
these offenses, and it was uncontested that the exact details of these foreign convictions 
were unknown. Id. 
14 See id. at 93. 
15 Id. 
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so would violate the United States policy of non-refoulement.16 This policy 
recognizes a refugee’s right not to be expelled from one state to an-
other where his or her life or liberty would be threatened.17 
 The IJ further concluded, however, that because Mrs. Alaka had 
been convicted of a “particularly serious” crime under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), she would have to be removed to her native coun-
try, regardless of the conditions she might face there.18 Mrs. Alaka’s 
crime did not fit the statute’s per se definition of a particularly serious 
crime—an aggravated felony carrying a sentence of five years or 
more.19 Instead, the IJ, under the authority vested in him by the U.S. 
Attorney General, made a discretionary decision that the crime was of a 
particularly serious nature.20 The Bureau of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) refused to overturn this discretionary decision on appeal.21 
Whether Congress intended to grant IJs the discretion to declare any 
crime particularly serious and whether appellate courts have the power 
to review these decisions remain disputed matters among the U.S. 
courts of appeals and form the basis of this Note.22 
                                                                                                                      
16 Non-refoulement is from the French “refouler,” meaning “to drive back.” Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1083 (8th ed. 2004). 
17 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006) (stating that the United States will not return 
an alien to a country where he or she will be threatened because of his or her race, relig-
ion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion). 
18 See Alaka, 456 F.3d at 93; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). 
19 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B); Alaka, 456 F.3d at 95. 
20 See Alaka, 456 F.3d at 95. Whether such a decision is within the Attorney General’s 
discretion is significant because a related statute denies courts the jurisdiction to review 
any “decision or action of the Attorney General . . . the authority for which is specified . . . 
to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). 
Thus, if the definition of a particularly serious crime is committed to the discretion of the 
Attorney General, a court clearly lacks jurisdiction to review his decision. See id.; Alaka, 456 
F.3d at 94. It is unclear from the record what led the IJ to the conclusion that Alaka’s prior 
conviction constituted a particularly serious crime. See Alaka, 456 F.3d at 94. When he de-
nied Alaka’s timely motion for reconsideration, the IJ stated: “[W]hile I do not recall with 
specificity all of the factors which led me to find [Alaka’s] conviction to be a ‘particularly 
serious crime’ . . . [her] brief, well presented as it is, does not convince me that I erred.” 
See id. 
21 See Alaka, 456 F.3d at 94. 
22 Currently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit do not interpret § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) as giving this discretion 
to the Attorney General. Both circuits have concluded that they have jurisdiction for ap-
pellate review of whether or not a crime is particularly serious. See Nethagani v. Mukasey, 
532 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2008); Alaka, 456 F.3d at 95. The issue arose recently in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, where the court acknowledged the split among the 
circuits but did not address the issue, and instead resolved the case on a different constitu-
tional claim. See Solorzano-Moreno v. Mukasey, 296 Fed. Appx. 391, 394 n.5 (5th Cir. 
2008). The Seventh Circuit had not addressed the issue squarely for an extended period, 
but indicated in dicta that it would also be willing to exercise jurisdiction. See Ali v. Ash-
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 This Note examines the different statutory interpretations applied 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) by the different U.S. courts of appeals.23 
A thorough examination of the statute and its history will show that the 
interpretation currently applied by the majority of circuits creates a lar-
ger particularly serious crimes exception than Congress intended.24 
Part I of this Note explores the forum in which the statute is applied, 
the individuals it affects, and the origin and evolution of the statute 
through its many amendments.25 Part II examines the language of the 
statute and the surrounding language of the act in which it is con-
tained.26 Part III examines whether IJs’ administrative interpretations of 
these cases are owed deference under the Chevron standard, which pre-
cludes judicial review of administrative decisions in some situations.27 
Part IV argues that to properly effectuate the statute’s intent, IJs should 
have the power to declare a crime particularly serious only if it is an 
aggravated felony and that appellate courts should have jurisdiction to 
see that this power is properly exercised.28 Additionally, it argues that in 
addition to committing a particularly serious crime, an alien must also 
                                                                                                                      
croft, 395 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2005); Bosede v. Ashcroft, 309 F.3d 441, 447–48 (7th Cir. 
2002). It reversed course recently, however, and concluded that jurisdiction is not proper. 
See Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 469 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. dismissed, 128 S. Ct. 828 (2007). The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit similarly refuses to exercise jurisdiction, and 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has issued an unpublished opinion indicat-
ing it would also place the issue beyond its jurisdiction. See Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 
863, 872 (9th Cir. 2009); Celaj v. Ashcroft, 121 Fed. Appx. 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2005). The 
BIA advocates on its own behalf that appellate courts do not have jurisdiction to review its 
determinations of whether a crime is particularly serious. In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 
338–39 (B.I.A. 2007). 
23 The issue is one of such significance that the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari 
with an expedited briefing schedule in the matter of Ali v. Achim on September 25, 2007 to 
define the proper interpretation. See 128 S. Ct. 29 (2007). The writ of certiorari was subse-
quently dismissed, however, on December 27, 2007, when attorneys for the petitioner set-
tled with the government on a separate claim, thereby allowing their client to remain in 
the country. Tony Mauro, High Court’s High-Profile Cases Guarantee Controversy, Recorder 
(San Francisco), Jan. 7, 2008, at 3. Though the larger statutory issue was not resolved, 
David Gossett, attorney for the petitioner, stated that other cases in the appeals pipeline 
would soon bring the same issue to the Court. See id. 
24 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–37 
(1987) (finding that the language of the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees was adopted with the intent of conforming U.S. law to international 
obligations); Nethagani, 532 F.3d at 154; Alaka, 456 F.3d at 95. 
25 See infra notes 30–97 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 98–120 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 121–159 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 160–216 and accompanying text. 
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pose an ongoing danger to the community to be denied withholding of 
removal.29 
I. The Operation and History of the Particularly Serious 
Crimes Exception to Withholding of Removal 
A. The Operation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) 
 Aliens who are lawfully within the United States are nevertheless 
subject to removal from the country if they fall within one or more of 
the classes of deportable aliens established by the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (“INA” or the “Act”).30 The Act specifically enumerates a 
number of crimes for which legal aliens can be removed from the 
country.31 Removal proceedings are initiated by the Department of 
Homeland Security and are adjudicated by IJs.32 An alien who obtains 
an adverse ruling from an IJ can appeal his or her case to the BIA.33 
Both IJs and the BIA act under the authority granted to them by the 
Attorney General.34 
 When the government initiates removal proceedings against an 
alien, there are numerous forms of relief by which the party can try to 
avoid removal.35 These forms of relief include voluntary departure, 
cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, waiver, asylum, and with-
holding of removal.36 These final two categories are forms of relief for 
deportable aliens who fear that they will be persecuted if they are re-
                                                                                                                      
29 See infra notes 217–241 and accompanying text. 
30 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006). 
31 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2006). Aliens who are in the United States illegally are 
similarly subject to removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1). 
32 See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: Immigration Court Process in the 
United States: Removal Proceedings, Bond Redeterminations, Asylum, Convention Against 
Torture (Apr. 28, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/05/ImmigrationCourtProcess 
2005.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2009). IJs are administrative judges located within the Execu-
tive Office for Immigration Review and are appointed by the Attorney General. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(b)(4) (2000). Unlike an Article III judge, an IJ serves as a fact-finder and adjudicator 
and has an affirmative obligation to establish and develop the record in the course of with-
holding of removal and asylum proceedings. See Boci v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 
2007) (citing Hansanai v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
33 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2008). 
34 See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 32. 
35 See id. The Department of Justice notes that “[i]n most removal proceedings, aliens 
concede that they are removable, but then apply for one or more forms of relief from re-
moval.” Id.; see also Veena Reddy, Note, Judicial Review of Final Orders of Removal in the Wake of 
the Real ID Act, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 557, 563 (2008). 
36 See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 32. 
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turned to their home country.37 Asylum is a discretionary form of relief 
available when the alien shows that he or she has a “well-founded fear 
of persecution” in his or her home country.38 Withholding of removal 
applies a higher standard, requiring that the alien show a “clear prob-
ability of persecution,” but when this higher standard is met, the re-
quested relief is mandatory rather than discretionary.39 
 Thus, an alien who would otherwise be subject to removal under 
the INA will be allowed to remain in the United States if he can show 
that he would be persecuted if returned to his native country.40 Aliens 
who have committed a particularly serious crime, however, are prohib-
ited from relying on asylum or withholding of removal.41 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) provides that even if a deportable alien can show 
that he will be subject to persecution in his native country, he will not 
be eligible for withholding of removal if he has committed a particu-
larly serious crime.42 What constitutes a particularly serious crime and 
when IJs have discretion to make such a determination are contested 
issues.43 The answers have evolved and shifted over time as Congress 
has passed legislation revising and amending the definition of a par-
ticularly serious crime and the attendant power of the Attorney General 
to apply his own definition.44 
                                                                                                                      
37 See id. 
38 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987). 
39 See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413 (1984). Once granted, asylum also affords broader 
benefits than withholding of removal alone. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 428–29 n.6 (citing 
In re Lam, 18 I. & N. Dec. 15, 18 (B.I.A. 1981)). Withholding of removal applies only to 
“country specific” deportation. See Lam, 18 I. & N. at 18. Thus, under withholding of removal, 
an Afghani alien could not be deported to Afghanistan, but could, for instance, be deported 
to Pakistan or to any other hospitable country. See id. Under asylum, however, an alien may be 
eligible for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident. See id. Additionally, 
when an alien is granted asylum, she is temporarily admitted into the United States. See H.R. 
Rep. No. 109-72, at 168 (2005). When an alien is granted withholding of removal, she is not 
granted legal entry into the Unites States and may be removed to her country of origin when 
the threat to her life and freedom has passed. See id. 
40 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006). 
41 See id. § (b)(3)(B)(ii). 
42 See id. 
43 See Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 872 (9th Cir. 2009); Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 
F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2008); Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 469 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. dismissed, 
128 S. Ct. 828 (2007); Alaka v. Att’y Gen of the U.S., 456 F.3d 88, 95 (3d. Cir. 2006). 
44 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 305, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-602; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 413, 110 Stat. 1214, 1269; Immigration and Nation-
ality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320–22; 
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 515, 104 Stat. 4978, 5053; Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469–70; Immigration and 
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B. The Legislative History of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) 
 The first provision providing a form of relief equivalent to with-
holding of removal was created in 1948.45 At that time Congress added 
a provision to the Immigration Act of 1917 allowing for a “suspension 
of deportation” for deportable aliens.46 This provision did not confer 
any kind of right to a deportable alien, but rather provided for the “un-
fettered discretion of the Attorney General” to grant relief from depor-
tation when he deemed it appropriate.47 The decision was so com-
pletely within the control of the Attorney General that suspension of 
deportation was regarded as “an act of grace” on the part of the Attor-
ney General when exercised.48 Although suspension of deportation was 
completely discretionary, aliens wishing to challenge their deportation 
did have the right to file a habeas corpus petition in federal district 
court to achieve the same end.49 
 The next and most significant development took place with the 
adoption of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the 
“Convention”) in 1951.50 The Convention was convened in the post-
World War II environment to confront the significant refugee problems 
that resulted from the conflict.51 The Convention prohibited “re-
turn[ing] a refugee in any manner whatsoever to [a country] where his 
life or freedom would be threatened,” thereby establishing for the first 
time the non-refoulement prohibition.52 The initial draft contained no 
exception to this rule, but a narrow exception was subsequently intro-
duced to permit the removal of an alien who, “having been convicted 
. . . of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the commu-
                                                                                                                      
Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 202, 94 Stat. 102 (1980); Selective Service Act of 
1948, Pub. L. No. 80-864, 62 Stat. 1206, 1206. 
45 See Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. at 1206. 
46 See id. 
47 See Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 354 (1956). 
48 See id. 
49 See, e.g., In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 116 (1853). See generally United States v. 
Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621 (1888). 
50 See generally Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 
189 U.N.T.S. 150. The Convention has been ratified by 144 countries making it one of the most 
widely accepted treaties in refugee law. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, States Party to 
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol 1 (2008), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf. 
51 See Sadako Ogata, Introduction to Paul Weis, The Refugee Convention, 1951: The 
Travaux Preparatoires Analysed with a Commentary by Dr. Paul Weis, at ix (Paul 
Weis ed., 1995). 
52 See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 50, at art. 33. 
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nity of that country.”53 This provision was meant to be a very narrow 
exception to the prevailing obligation of non-refoulement, and some 
Convention members expressed their reluctance to create any excep-
tion to the obligation at all.54 With the understanding that a narrow 
exception would apply only in extreme cases, the duty of non-refoulement 
and the particularly serious crimes exception were ratified and entered 
into force on April 22, 1954.55 Because the Convention was focused on 
the problems created by World War II, a dateline limited its application 
to the then-identified group of refugees, namely Europeans who had 
become refugees as a result of events before January 1, 1951.56 
 Not surprisingly, in the years following the Convention, refugee 
problems began to arise in regions of the world that were not governed 
by the original agreement.57 In response, the  United Nations issued its 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Protocol”) in 1967 to ad-
dress refugee issues more generally.58 The Protocol removed the date-
line from the Convention with the goal of making it the universal inter-
                                                                                                                      
53 Id. The Convention did not explicitly define a particularly serious crime, but it did 
provide a basis for comparison by defining a “serious nonpolitical crime.” See UN High 
Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, 
¶ 155, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Engl.REV.1 ( Jan. 5, 1992). In the Convention, a “serious 
non-political crime” is described as “a capital crime or very grave punishable act.” Id. Thus, 
to qualify as a particularly serious crime under the Convention, an offense had to be even 
more serious than a very grave punishable act. See In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 
(B.I.A. 1982). 
54 See Weis, supra note 51, at 325–34. “[T]he Committee [on Refugees and Stateless 
Persons] felt strongly that the principle here expressed was fundamental and should not 
be impaired.” Id. at 327. Indeed, the United States delegate responded to the proposal of 
the exception by saying that “it would be highly undesirable to suggest . . . that there might 
be cases, even highly exceptional cases, where a man might be sent to death or persecu-
tion.” Id. at 326. The United Kingdom co-sponsoring delegate of this non-refoulement excep-
tion responded to this criticism by saying that “[he] hoped that the scope of the joint 
amendment would not be unduly widened.” Id. at 333. The French co-sponsoring delegate 
agreed that “[t]here was no worse catastrophe for an individual who had succeeded after 
many vicissitudes in leaving a country where he was being persecuted than to be returned 
to that country” and that “[r]easons such as the security of the country were the only ones 
which could be invoked against [the] right [of asylum].” Id. at 327, 329. 
55 See Ogata, supra note 51, at ix. The United Nations rejected a proposal to authorize 
refoulement for habitual offenders convicted of a series of less serious crimes. See Weis, supra 
note 51, at 325–34. 
56 See Ogata, supra note 51, at ix. Despite this limitation, the Convention contained a 
recommendation that it should have value exceeding its contractual scope and that na-
tions should be guided by it in extending its protections to refugees not explicitly covered 
by its terms. See id. 
57 See id. at ix–x. 
58 See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267; Ogata, supra note 51, at ix–x. 
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national instrument for the protection of refugees.59 The United States 
bound itself to this expanded duty when it acceded to the Protocol.60 
 The United States further affirmed its commitment to the Conven-
tion and its language in 1980, when Congress amended the INA.61 One 
of the primary motivating factors for this amendment was to bring 
United States statutory law governing refugees into accord with the 
1967 Protocol.62 Congress passed the amendment for the purpose of 
explicitly adopting from the Convention both the non-refoulement policy 
and the narrow exception for particularly serious crimes.63 Thus, the 
1980 amendment revised section 243(h) of the INA to deny withhold-
ing of removal to an individual who, “having been convicted by a final 
judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the 
community of the United States.”64 In adopting both the non-refoulement 
policy and the exception, Congress adopted nearly the exact language 
used by the 1951 Convention.65 
                                                                                                                      
59 See Ogata, supra note 51, at ix–x. 
60 See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 58; INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 
407, 416 (1984). 
61 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2000). The House Judiciary Committee Report stated, “al-
though [U.S. law] has been held by court and administrative decisions to accord to aliens 
the protection required under Article 33, the Committee feels it is desireable, for the sake 
of clarity, to conform the language of that section to the Convention. H.R. Rep. No. 96-
608, at 1–5 (1979). 
62 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436–37. Presumably, the Protocol had not explicitly 
constrained the Attorney General’s discretionary power because he had been honoring 
the dictates of the Convention already. See id. at 429. Nevertheless, the INA explicitly re-
moved discretion from the Attorney General. See id. 
63 See id. at 436–37. 
64 Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 202, 94 Stat. 102, 107 (1980). 
65 Compare Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 50, at art. 33, with 
§ 202, 94 Stat. at 107. Article 33 of the Convention reads, “No contracting state shall expel 
or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories where his life 
or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion.” Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, supra note 50, at art. 33. The analogous language in U.S. law, which has under-
gone only minor changes over the years, stated that “[the] Attorney General shall not de-
port or return any alien . . . to a country if the Attorney General determines that such 
alien’s life or freedom would be threatened . . . .” § 203(e), 94 Stat. at 107. The Conven-
tion’s exception provided that “[t]he benefit of [non-refoulement] may not . . . be claimed by 
a refugee whom, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community of that country.” Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, supra note 50, at art. 33. The United States exception to this policy declares 
that it does not apply “to any alien if the Attorney General determines that . . . the alien, 
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a 
danger to the community of the United States.” § 202, 94 Stat. at 107. 
218 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 50:209 
 Under this standard, it was left to the BIA to determine on a case-
by-case basis which crimes should be declared particularly serious.66 In 
1982, in In re Frentescu, the BIA established a balancing test consisting of 
four factors used to determine if a crime was particularly serious.67 It 
established that the IJ was to investigate and weigh: (1) the nature of 
the conviction; (2) the circumstances and underlying facts of the con-
viction; (3) the type of sentence imposed; and (4) whether the type and 
circumstances of the crime indicated that the alien would be a danger 
to the community.68 The BIA standard also considered whether the 
crime had been committed against a person or property.69 The former 
was more likely to be considered particularly serious but the latter not 
barred from consideration.70 Applying these factors in Frentescu, the 
BIA concluded that the IJ erred in ruling that a Romanian citizen who 
had been convicted of burglary should not receive amnesty and re-
manded the case for further development.71 
 In the following years, with an eye towards promoting efficiency 
and uniformity, however, the BIA began to categorize certain crimes as 
per se particularly serious.72 This practice obviated the need for an in-
dividual investigation of a crime’s seriousness in every case.73 In 1986, 
in In re Caraballe, the BIA also adopted a policy that once an alien had 
been found to have committed a particularly serious crime, there was 
no need for a separate determination to address whether the alien was 
a danger to the community.74 In Carabelle the applicant was a Cuban 
citizen who had departed Cuba as part of the Mariel boatlift in 1980.75 
In 1983 he pled guilty to and was convicted of a number of charges 
stemming from a robbery.76 The IJ found that he was ineligible for 
withholding of removal because of his crime.77 On appeal, the BIA re-
jected the applicant’s contention that despite his crime being particu-
                                                                                                                      
66 In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 247, modified, In re C-, 20, I. & N. Dec. 529 (BIA 
1992). 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. at 244–45. The IJ made this ruling despite an advisory opinion from the De-
partment of State urging that the forcible return of Mr. Frentescu to Romania would likely 
entail serious consequences for him. See id. at 245. 
72 See, e.g., In re Garcia-Garrocho, 19 I. & N. Dec. 423, 425 (B.I.A. 1986). 
73 See id. 
74 19 I. & N. Dec. 357, 360 (B.I.A. 1986). 
75 See id. at 358. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. 
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larly serious, an additional showing that he constituted a danger to the 
community was needed before he could be denied withholding of re-
moval.78 Thus, an alien found to have committed a particularly serious 
crime was by law found to pose a danger to the community and was 
automatically denied withholding of removal.79 
 In order to further refine the definition of a particularly serious 
crime, Congress added the term “aggravated felony” to the INA 
through the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.80 Congress identified aggra-
vated felonies as the group of crimes for which non-citizens would be 
subject to the harshest immigration penalties.81 The Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1988 limited this group of crimes to murder, drug trafficking, 
and trafficking in firearms or destructive devices.82 
 Just a few years later, Congress attempted to clarify that the purpose 
behind the creation of the aggravated felony category was to control the 
definition of particularly serious crimes.83 To this end, it implemented 
the Immigration Act of 1990, which added the following language to 
section 243(h): “[A]n alien who has been convicted of an aggravated 
felony shall be considered to have committed a particularly serious 
crime.”84 This act also further expanded the definition of an aggravated 
felony to include money laundering and violent crimes when the alien 
received a prison sentence of five years or more.85 This legislation ren-
dered the BIA’s criteria for determining a particularly serious crime in-
applicable to many cases by automatically deeming many crimes particu-
larly serious.86 
 Keeping with this trend of enlarging the definition of an aggra-
vated felony, Congress used the Immigration and Nationality Technical 
Corrections Act of 1994 to expand again the list of crimes that fit the 
definition of a particularly serious crime.87 The act added a variety of 
                                                                                                                      
78 See id. at 359. 
79 See id. at 360. 
80 Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469–70 (1988). It should be noted that 
the term “aggravated felony” is a concept of immigration law only, not criminal law. Tova 
Indritz, Puzzling out the Immigration Consequences of Various Criminal Convictions: Part II, 26 
Champion, Mar. 2002, at 20. 
81 See Indritz, supra note 80, at 20. 
82 § 7342, 102 Stat. at 4469. 
83 Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 515, 104 Stat. 4978, 5053 (1990). 
84 See id. 
85 Id. 
86 See id. 
87 See Pub. L. 103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320–22 (1994). The list has grown so sig-
nificantly that it has caused some commentators to joke that “it might be briefer to list all 
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new offenses to the growing group of aggravated felonies, including 
offenses related to kidnapping, racketeering, prostitution, transmitting 
national defense information, fraud with a loss to the victim of more 
than $200,000, document fraud, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit 
any of these offenses.88 
 Congress then changed course and moved away from this cate-
gorical approach to aggravated felonies when it passed the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).89 Sec-
tion 413(f) of this act amended section 243(h) of the INA to allow the 
Attorney General “in [his] discretion” to override the categorical bar 
designating all aggravated felonies particularly serious when “necessary 
to ensure compliance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees.”90 Thus, Congress relaxed the per se defini-
tion of particularly serious crimes so that the Attorney General could 
remove aggravated felonies from this category if he judged them not to 
be particularly serious.91 The BIA applied this standard so that an alien 
convicted of an aggravated felony or felonies and sentenced to at least 
five years of incarceration was conclusively barred from withholding of 
removal.92 An alien convicted of an aggravated felony or felonies and 
sentenced to an aggregate of fewer than five years would be subject to a 
rebuttable presumption that he had been convicted of a particularly 
serious crime, which would bar him from withholding of removal.93 
 Finally, later that same year, Congress passed the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”).94 
This act enacted the aforementioned 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), 
which limited the application of the categorical bar to aggravated felo-
nies carrying sentences of five years imprisonment or more.95 One of 
Congress’s aims in enacting these post-1990 statutory amendments was 
to avoid sweeping minor crimes into the categorical aggravated felony 
bar.96 
                                                                                                                      
crimes not aggravated felonies than to list the aggravated felonies.” See Indritz, supra note 
80, at 20. 
88 See § 222, 108 Stat. at 4320. 
89 Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 413, 110 Stat. 1214, 1269 (1996). 
90 Id. 
91 See id. 
92 See In re Q-T-M-T-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 639, 654 (B.I.A. 1996). 
93 See id. 
94 Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 305, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-602 (2006). 
95 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006). 
96 See Delgado, 563 F.3d at 869. 
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 Thus after nearly seventy years and numerous changes to the stat-
ute, we arrive at the current incarnation of the statutory definition of a 
“particularly serious crime”: 
[A]n alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony (or 
felonies) for which the alien has been sentenced to an aggre-
gate term of imprisonment of at least 5 years shall be consid-
ered to have committed a particularly serious crime. The pre-
vious sentence shall not preclude the Attorney General from 
determining that, notwithstanding the length of sentence im-
posed, an alien has been convicted of a particularly serious 
crime.97 
II. The Language of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii): Are the 
Attorney General’s Powers to Decide and Determine 
Equivalent to the Power of Discretion? 
A. Courts That Find Discretion Fully Vested in the Attorney General 
 There are two sentences in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) that might 
be read to place the determination of the definition of a particularly 
serious crime within the discretion of the Attorney General.98 First, “if 
the Attorney General decides that . . . the alien [has] been convicted . . . 
                                                                                                                      
97 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). One final piece of legislation worth noting, though 
not directly affecting the particularly serious crimes exception, is the REAL ID Act of 2005. 
See Pub. L. No. 109-13, 19 Stat. 231 (2005). This act was passed in part to “address the 
anomalies” created by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. St. Cyr and its progeny. 
See H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 174. In 2001, the Supreme Court held in St. Cyr that the 
AEDPA and IIRIRA did not prevent the Court from hearing the habeas petition of re-
spondent, who had been convicted of the deportable offense of selling a controlled sub-
stance. See 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001). The anomaly created by this case was that non-citizens 
who were guilty of a deportable criminal offense were permitted to seek review of their 
removal orders in U.S. district court and then appeal to the U.S. court of appeals, whereas 
non-criminal aliens were able to seek review only in a U.S. court of appeals. See Xiao Ji 
Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 153 n.5 (2d Cir. 2006); Ishak v. Gonzales, 422 
F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Reddy, supra note 35, at 570. Congress was thus con-
cerned that aliens who had committed serious crimes in the United States could obtain 
more judicial review than their non-criminal counterparts. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 
174. The implication of St. Cyr will be more fully discussed below, but for present purposes 
it is sufficient to note that the REAL ID Act placed review of all final removal orders for 
both criminal and non-criminal aliens in the court of appeals by stripping district courts of 
jurisdiction to hear any final orders of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)(4) (2006) 
(“[A] petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this 
section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review . . . .”). 
98 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). 
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of a particularly serious crime” that alien is ineligible for withholding of 
removal.99 Second, the statute provides that in spite of the provision of 
per se categories of particularly serious crimes, the Attorney General 
“shall not [be] preclude[d] from determining that” the alien has commit-
ted a particularly serious crime.100 Standing alone, these two sentences 
suggest that the statute leaves it within the discretion of the Attorney 
General to decide when an alien has committed a particularly serious 
crime.101 Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit accept these sentences on 
their face as a congressional grant of discretion to the Attorney Gen-
eral.102 
 In 2006, in Ali v. Achim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit held that this language granted IJs discretion to declare 
crimes—aggravated felonies or otherwise—to be particularly serious.103 
Ali was convicted on a felony charge of substantial battery with a dan-
gerous weapon following an altercation with a man who, along with 
three other friends, had beaten him previously.104 After pleading no 
contest, he was sentenced to eleven months of incarceration in a work-
release facility.105 Ali argued that because his crime was not an aggra-
vated felony, it could not be particularly serious; the court rejected that 
argument.106 Similarly, in 2009, in Delgado v. Holder, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the BIA had reasonably inter-
preted 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) as extending full discretion to IJs 
                                                                                                                      
99 See id. (emphasis added). 
100 See id. (emphasis added). Similar language can be found in the legislative history, as 
in House Conference Report No. 104-828, wherein it is stated that, “the Attorney General 
retains the authority to determine other circumstances in which an alien has been convicted 
of a particularly serious crime, regardless of the length of sentence.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-
828, at 216 (1996) (emphasis added). 
101 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 216. 
102 See Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 872 (9th Cir. 2009); Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 
469–70 (7th Cir. 2006). 
103 See 468 F.3d at 469–70. The petitioner in Ali was a young Somali man who had been 
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder caused by his experiences in Somalia. See id. 
at 465. In Somalia, two of Ali’s brothers were killed, one by a stray bullet and the other by a 
street gang. See id. at 464. Ali’s sister was also killed when she resisted rape at the hands of 
soldiers, an event that Ali witnessed. See id. He was shot at on two or three occasions and 
was beaten by militia. See id. Uncontradicted expert testimony stated that Ali would likely 
be beaten and robbed and, in many places, would be targeted for death if he were forced 
to return to Somalia. See id. at 463–64. 
104 See id. at 464–65. 
105 See id. at 465. 
106 See id. at 469–70. 
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in deciding what crimes were particularly serious.107 In Delgado, the pe-
titioner was convicted three times for driving under the influence dur-
ing his twenty years in the United States.108 There, as in Ali, the court 
held that the BIA’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B), which 
allowed non-aggravated felonies to be particularly serious crimes, was 
reasonable.109 
B. Courts That Find Discretion Is Not Fully Vested in the Attorney General 
 In contrast, in Alaka v. Attorney General, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit ruled in 2006 that looking at these two sentences 
in isolation did not present the full picture.110 Indeed, it found that 
case law required the examination of the statute as a whole to deter-
mine whether discretionary authority had been specified.111 Looking at 
the subchapter of the INA in which § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) appears, the 
court found thirty-two additional provisions that make explicit a grant 
of discretion to the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland 
Security.112 In each of these thirty-two instances, the statute explicitly 
                                                                                                                      
107 See 563 F.3d at 869. The petitioner was a citizen of El Salvador who entered the 
United States on a nonimmigrant visitor visa but then overstayed his allotted time. See id. at 
866. The court held that Delgado had failed to meet his burden of showing that he was 
likely to be tortured if returned to El Salvador. See id. at 874. He presented evidence that 
his parents were victims of the rampant human rights violations in the early 1980s when he 
fled the country. See id. He did not show, however, that he faced a current risk if returned 
to his native country. See id. Country reports indicated that conditions in El Salvador had 
improved significantly since his departure and there was no longer evidence of political 
killings. See id. 
108 See id. at 866. 
109 See id.; Ali, 468 F.3d at 469–70. 
110 See 456 F.3d 88, 96–98 (3d Cir. 2006). 
111 See id. at 97–98 (citing United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 452–53 (3d Cir. 
1992)); see also Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) (holding that “it is the duty 
of the court to ‘not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but [to] look 
to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’”)(citations omitted). 
112 See Alaka, 456 F.3d at 97; see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(5) (2006) (“shall, in his discre-
tion, appoint . . . employees”); 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1) (2006) (“the Attorney General may, 
in the Attorney General’s discretion”); 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (2006) (“in the Secretary’s or 
the Attorney General’s discretion”); 8 U.S.C. § 1181(b) (2006) (“the Attorney General in 
his discretion”); 8 U.S.C. § 1183 (2006)(“in the discretion of the Attorney General . . . .”); 
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4) (2006) (“in the discretion of the Attorney General”); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I) (2006) (“in the sole and unreviewable discretion of the Attorney 
General”); 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (2006) (“in the discretion of the Attorney General”); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1281(a) (2006) (“in the discretion of the Attorney General”); 8 U.S.C. § 1281(c) (2006) 
(“in the discretion of the Attorney General”); 8 U.S.C. § 1286 (2006) (“in the discretion of 
the Attorney General”); 8 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2006) (“[t]he Attorney General may, in his 
discretion”); 8 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (2006) (“in the discretion of the Attorney General”); 8 
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uses the word “discretion.”113 The court concluded that canons of statu-
tory construction require that if Congress had wanted to give the At-
torney General discretion to define a particularly serious crime, it 
needed to employ the same explicit language it had used in thirty-two 
other locations throughout the subchapter of the statute.114 As a result, 
the court emphasized that jurisdiction was not stripped in all instances 
where an IJ was entitled to make a decision, only in those instances 
where Congress had taken the extra step of specifying that the sole au-
thority for the action was in the IJs’ discretion.115 
 Similarly, in 2008 in Nethagani v. Mukasey, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that the language of the statute was 
not meant to put IJ decisions beyond the scope of review of appellate 
courts.116 The BIA denied petitioner’s claim for withholding of removal 
                                                                                                                      
U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2006) (“in the discretion of the Attorney General”); 8 U.S.C. § 1353 
(2006) (“within the discretion . . . of the Attorney General”). 
113 See Alaka, 456 F.3d at 97–98. 
114 See id. (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that where sections of a 
statute do not include a specific term used elsewhere in the statute, the drafters did not 
wish such a requirement to apply.”) (quoting Mobley, 956 F.2d at 452–53). It should also be 
noted that although the explicit use of the word “discretion” would strongly indicate a 
jurisdictional bar, the absence of the word alone is not sufficient to show that Congress did 
not mean to create a jurisdictional bar. See Jilin Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196, 
203–05 (3d Cir. 2006); Soltane v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 381 F.3d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 2004); 
Urena-Tavarez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2004). In related cases in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in determining whether Congress had intended to 
raise a jurisdictional bar to judicial review, the court did not rely exclusively or even pri-
marily on the presence or absence of the word “discretion.” See Jilin Pharm., 447 F.3d at 
203–05; Soltane, 381 F.3d at 147; Urena-Tavarez, 367 F.3d at 160. In 2004, in Soltane v. U.S. 
Department of Justice, which raised a similar question of discretionary authority, the Third 
Circuit focused on other language in the statute to reach its decision. See 381 F.3d at 147. 
Beyond the absence of the word “discretion,” the definition of the term in question was 
fairly detailed and specific, and the statute instructed that the Attorney General “shall” 
take action, leading the court to find that there was no discretion. See id. 
In 2006, however, in Jilin Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, and in 2004 in Urena-Tavarez v. 
Ashcroft, the Third Circuit found that discretion did lie with the Secretary of Homeland 
Security despite the absence of the word “discretion.” See Jilin Pharm., 447 F.3d at 203–05; 
Urena-Tavarez, 367 F.3d at 160–61. In Jilin Pharm., the court looked at other language in the 
statute connoting discretion, such as the specification that the Attorney General “may” 
(rather than “shall”) revoke approval of a petition, something he is authorized to do “at 
any time.” See Jilin Pharm., 447 F.3d at 203. Additionally, the only limit on the discretion, 
was for “good and sufficient cause,” a limit so subjective that it provided no meaningful 
legal standard, and even then, it was also delegated to the Secretary. See id. at 204. Simi-
larly, in Urena-Tavarez, in addition to the use of the word “discretion,” the court found that 
the use of the word “may” and a grant of power to the Attorney General to decide “what 
evidence is credible and the weight” to accord it meant that discretion had been granted. 
See 367 F.3d at 159–60. 
115 See Alaka, 456 F.3d at 97–98. 
116 See 532 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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because it deemed his crime, reckless endangerment in the first de-
gree, particularly serious.117 On review, the court distinguished IJ deci-
sions that only require the IJ to make a routine determination from 
those decisions that the text of a statute specifically articulates as being 
in the discretion of the IJ.118 The court examined cases where it had 
previously ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review IJ decisions 
and found that in each such instance the statutes in question had spe-
cifically characterized the act as discretionary.119 The court concluded 
that because the statute in this instance did not expressly place the de-
termination within the discretion of the IJ, the decision was not solely 
within the IJ’s discretion and the court had the power to review the de-
cision.120 
                                                                                                                      
117 See id. at 152. Khalid Nethagani was a native and citizen of India who had shot into 
the air a gun that he possessed illegally. See id. 
118 See id. at 154–55. 
119 See id. at 154 n.2 (citing Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 98 n.7 (2d Cir. 2007); Atsilov 
v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 112, 116–17 (2d Cir. 2006); Jun Min Zhang v. Gonzales 457 F.3d 172, 
175–76 (2d Cir. 2006); Avendano-Espejo v. DHS, 448 F.3d 503, 505 (2d Cir. 2006); Saloum 
v. U.S. Citizenship & Immig. Servs., 437 F.3d 238, 242–44 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
120 See id. at 154–55. In Delgado, Judge Berzon also observed that a reading of the stat-
ute that granted the Attorney General discretion would conflict with the statutory inter-
pretation norm of “expressio unius est exclusio alterius.” See Delgado, 563 F.3d at 881 (Berzon, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). This interpretive rule states that the inclusion of 
one item ordinarily excludes similar items that could have been, but were not enumerated. 
See id. (citing Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003)). The statute specifi-
cally permits the Attorney General to designate an aggravated felony as a particularly seri-
ous crime, even though it carries a prison term of less than five years. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(B) (2006). Applying this rule of statutory interpretation, the fact that Con-
gress did not mention non-aggravated felonies carrying prison terms of less than five years 
means they did not intend to extend the discretion of the Attorney General that far. See 
Delgado, 563 F.3d at 881–82 (Berzon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined this argument in Ali and 
found it unconvincing. See 468 F.3d at 470. The court found that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) 
does not state a general rule that only aggravated felonies can be considered particularly 
serious crimes. See id. The court asserted that the designation of some crimes as per se par-
ticularly serious created no presumption that the Attorney General could not exercise discre-
tion on a case-by-case basis to decide that other non-aggravated felonies were also particularly 
serious. See id. It thus concluded that the absence of a provision for granting discretion for 
non-aggravated felonies did not imply that only aggravated felonies could qualify as particu-
larly serious crimes. See id. The court went on to conclude that to the extent that the statute 
might be ambiguous on this issue, the BIA’s decision was reasonable and thus was entitled to 
deference. See id. This interpretation was criticized by Judge Berzon in Delgado for “re[lying] 
on what the statute doesn’t say, rather than on what it does . . . .” See Delgado, 563 F.3d at 881 
(Berzon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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III. Chevron or St. Cyr : Does the U.S. Supreme Court Favor or 
Disfavor an Initial Presumption of Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action in the Immigration Setting? 
 In the seminal 1984 case of Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. the U.S. Supreme Court set forth the test for deter-
mining whether to grant deference to a government agency’s interpre-
tation of its own statutory mandate.121 There, the Natural Resources 
Defense Council challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(“EPA”) definition of major stationary sources of air pollution, but the 
Court upheld the EPA’s definition.122 The Court ruled that when the 
statute at issue speaks clearly and directly to the question at hand, 
courts and the agency both must give effect to Congress’s unambigu-
ously expressed intent.123 If, however, the statute is silent or ambiguous 
on a specific issue, a court must ask whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.124 If the construc-
tion is permissible, it should be given deference by the court, even if it 
differs from the construction the court would have given it if the ques-
tion had initially arisen in a judicial proceeding.125 Considerable weight 
is given to an executive department’s construction of a statutory 
scheme that department is entrusted to administer.126 The Court has 
explained that a deferential stance is especially important in the immi-
gration context where officials exercise sensitive political functions with 
serious implications for foreign relations.127 Some courts advocate that 
under this standard it is inappropriate for courts to review BIA deci-
sions regarding 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).128 
 In 2009, in Delgado v. Mukasey, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit deferred to the BIA on the proper interpretation of 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) under the Chevron standard.129 It held that 
the statutory designation of certain aggravated felonies as per se par-
ticularly serious did not preclude IJs from deciding that any other 
crime was also particularly serious.130 The petitioner was a citizen of El 
                                                                                                                      
121 See 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
122 See id. at 841–42. 
123 See id. at 842–43. 
124 See id. at 843. 
125 See id. at 843 n.11. 
126 See id. at 844. 
127 INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 
94, 110 (1988)). 
128 See Delgado v. Mukasey, 563 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2009). 
129 See id. 
130 See id. 
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Salvador who entered the United States on a nonimmigrant visitor visa 
and remained for over twenty years.131 During that time he was con-
victed three times for driving under the influence.132 The court held 
that it lacked jurisdiction to review the decision to declare the alien’s 
convictions particularly serious.133 In doing so, the court dismissed as 
not controlling a number of cases holding to the contrary because, at 
the time of the earlier decisions, the BIA had not addressed the issue in 
a precedential opinion.134 In 2007, however, the BIA issued such a pre-
cedential opinion in In re N-A-M-, concluding that § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) 
permitted the Attorney General to decide through case-by-case adjudi-
cation that crimes were “particularly serious,” even though they were 
not aggravated felonies.135 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held in 
Delgado that the N-A-M- opinion was entitled to deference under the 
Chevron standard.136 
 Although the Chevron standard can be argued to militate for judi-
cial deference to BIA decisions, Supreme Court decisions subsequent 
to Chevron call this argument into question.137 In 1987, in INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, the Court found unconvincing the argument that the BIA’s 
construction of the Refugee Act of 1980 was owed deference, even if 
the Court concluded that a lower court’s interpretation was more in 
keeping with Congress’s intent.138 There, a Nicaraguan woman entered 
the country as a visitor, but stayed longer than her visa permitted.139 At 
her deportation hearing she conceded that she was in the country ille-
gally, but applied for withholding of removal.140 The question before 
the Court was what standard of proof an alien must meet to show that 
she has a “well-founded fear” of persecution.141 In finding that a lower 
                                                                                                                      
131 See id. at 1019. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. at 867. 
134 See Delgado, 563 F.3d at 867. The issue had been addressed by a single BIA member 
in an unpublished opinion, but neither party contended that such a decision was owed any 
deference under the Chevron standard. See id. 
135 See 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 338–39 (B.I.A. 2007). 
136 See Delgado, 563 F.3d at 867. 
137 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 
445 (1987). 
138 See 480 U.S. at 445. 
139 See id. at 424. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. at 425–26. In trying to show that her fear was well-founded, the petitioner 
testified that her brother had been tortured and imprisoned for his political views. See id. 
at 424–25. She believed the Sandanistas knew that the two of them had fled the country 
together. See id. at 424. She testified that even though she had not been politically active 
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standard than that for which the BIA advocated was required, the Court 
cited its own language in Chevron.142 It explained that “[i]f a court, em-
ploying traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Con-
gress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is 
the law and must be given effect.”143 
 Another seminal case, which postdates Chevron, also supports judi-
cial review in the deportation arena.144 In 2001, in INS v. St. Cyr, the 
U.S. Supreme Court found that a “strong presumption in favor of judi-
cial review of administrative action” is the norm, even in deportation 
cases.145 The respondent in St. Cyr was a Haitian citizen who was admit-
ted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1986.146 In 
1996 he pleaded guilty to selling a controlled substance, a conviction 
which made him deportable.147 Between his conviction and his removal 
proceedings, Congress had passed the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act, which made him ineligible for a waiver of deporta-
tion.148 He brought a habeas corpus claim to determine whether these 
statutes applied retroactively to his case.149 In determining that these 
acts did not apply retroactively to the respondent, the Court concluded, 
inter alia, that “some ‘judicial intervention in deportation cases’ is un-
questionably ‘required by the Constitution.’”150 
 In 2006, in Alaka v. Attorney General, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit found that the strong showing necessary to overcome 
this presumption of judicial review had not been made with regard to 
the particularly serious crime exception.151 There, the petitioner was 
                                                                                                                      
herself, she would be interrogated and tortured to determine her brother’s whereabouts. 
See id. at 424–25. 
142 See id. at 447–48. 
143 See id. at 448 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9). 
144 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 300. 
145 Id. at 298. Similarly, in 1991, in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. MCorp 
Financial Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held that only a showing of “clear and convincing 
evidence” is sufficient to support a finding that Congress intended to preclude judicial 
review. See 502 U.S. 32, 44 (1991). Also, though not directly bearing on the issues discussed 
here, it is worth noting that the St Cyr Court ruled that neither the AEDPA nor IIRIRA 
denied federal courts jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions brought by criminals who 
were in custody under deportation orders, thereby showing a continued preference for 
judicial review. See 533 U.S. at 314. 
146 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293. 
147 See id. 
148 See id. 
149Id. 
150 See id. at 300 (quoting Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953)). 
151 See 456 F.3d 88, 101 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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denied withholding of removal for her conviction of aiding and abet-
ting bank fraud.152 The court thus found that it was not stripped of ju-
risdiction to determine if the alien had been convicted of a particularly 
serious crime.153 It went on to find that because aiding and abetting 
bank fraud was not an aggravated felony, it could not be considered a 
particularly serious crime.154 
 In 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit invoked 
St. Cyr in Nethagani v. Mukasey.155 Khalid Nethagani was a citizen of In-
dia.156 He was convicted of reckless endangerment in the first degree 
after he shot into the air a gun that he possessed illegally.157 The BIA 
denied his claim for withholding of removal because it deemed his 
crime particularly serious.158 Citing St. Cyr and its strong presumption 
in favor of judicial review, the court held that when a statute authorizes 
the Attorney General to make a determination, but lacks additional 
language specifically rendering that determination to be within his dis-
cretion, the decision is subject to review by appellate courts.159 
IV. How the Particularly Serious Crimes Exception Should Be 
Revised to Comport with Its Original Intent 
 Non-refoulement has come to be recognized as “the cornerstone of 
international refugee law.”160 It has its origins in the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees  and the Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, to which the United States is a signatory and which 
it incorporated into United States law.161 The obligations and spirit of 
the Protocol, more than anything, should be the driving force in inter-
preting the particularly serious crimes exception to withholding of re-
moval.162 Courts that allow the BIA to declare any crime particularly 
                                                                                                                      
152 See id. at 93. 
153 See id. at 101–02. 
154 See id. at 105, 109. This holding was significantly strengthened by the REAL ID Act 
of 2005, which explicitly provided for review of all final removal orders in the U.S. courts 
of appeals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006). 
155 Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2009). 
156 See id. at 152. 
157 See id. 
158 See id. 
159 See id. at 154–55. Though the court found that it did have the power to review the 
BIA’s decision, it then deferred to the BIA, citing Chevron, in what it thought was a reason-
able construction of the ambiguous statutory language. See id. at 156. 
160 António Guterres, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Address to the League of Arab 
States (Mar. 4, 2007), in 27 Refugee Surv. Q. 66, 66 (2008). 
161 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987). 
162 See id. 
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serious have lost sight of this and have allowed the BIA to stray from the 
original impetus for creating these laws.163 This Part argues that courts 
must honor the intent of the Protocol, and thus of Congress, by apply-
ing a more restrictive understanding of the particularly serious crimes 
exception.164 To do so, courts must exercise judicial review of BIA deci-
sions on this issue and not allow non-aggravated felonies to be declared 
particularly serious crimes.165 This Part also argues that beyond this 
resolution of the circuit conflict, another step must be taken to ensure 
compliance with the United States’ obligations under the Protocol: 
courts must find that an individual poses a continuing danger to the 
community before they may deny him protection under withholding of 
removal provisions.166 
A. Judicial Review of the Application of the Particularly Serious Crimes 
Exception Is Appropriate 
 Courts that hold that there should not be judicial review of BIA de-
cisions on whether a crime is particularly serious support this position by 
alternatively pointing to the Chevron standard or the language of the 
statute vesting unfettered discretion in the Attorney General.167 Neither 
of these sources, however, actually supports this position.168 
1. Chevron Deference Is Not Appropriate in Light of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Rulings in Cardoza-Fonseca and St. Cyr 
 U.S. Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Chevron U.S.A. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. clearly show that Chevron does not 
control with respect to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(B)(ii).169 In 1984 the 
U.S. Supreme Court did establish in Chevron that when a statute is silent 
or ambiguous on a specific issue, a court must ask whether an agency’s 
interpretation of that statute is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute and, if so, give that interpretation deference.170 In 1987, in 
                                                                                                                      
163 See id. 
164 See Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2008); Alaka v. Att’y Gen. of 
the U.S., 456 F.3d 88, 101 (3d Cir. 2006). 
165 See infra notes 167–216 and accompanying text. 
166 See infra notes 217–239 and accompanying text. 
167 See Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 2009); Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 
468–469 (7th Cir. 2006). 
168 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297–98 (2001); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 445; Ne-
thagani, 532 F.3d at 154; Alaka, 456 F.3d at 101–02. 
169 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 297–98; Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 445. 
170 See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 480 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
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INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, however, the Court found that the BIA’s con-
struction of the Refugee Act of 1980 was not owed Chevron deference.171 
In ruling on the standard of proof an alien must meet to show that they 
have a “well-founded fear of persecution,” the Court found that the 
plain language of the act, its symmetry with the United Nations Proto-
col, and its legislative history led inexorably to a different conclusion 
than that reached by the BIA.172 The Court found that because tradi-
tional rules of statutory construction revealed Congress’s intent, it was 
the Court’s obligation to give that law effect.173 Again, in 2001, in INS v. 
St. Cyr, in overturning a BIA ruling that the AEDPA and IIRIRA applied 
retroactively to an alien, the Court found that it did have jurisdiction to 
review the case and that a strong presumption in favor of judicial review 
should prevail even in deportation cases.174 
 In light of these subsequent rulings, particularly the overwhelming 
similarities between the question presented and sources examined by 
the Court in Cardoza-Fonseca and the sources necessary to interpret the 
particularly serious crimes exception, it is plain that Chevron deference 
is not required with regard to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(B)(ii).175 All the 
same factors that the Court considered in Cardoza-Fonseca—the plain 
language of the act in question, its symmetry with the United Nations 
Protocol, and its legislative history—should be similarly considered 
here.176 Because Congress’s intention on the precise issue of interpreta-
tion of the particularly serious crimes exception is as clear as its inten-
tion regarding a “well-founded fear of persecution” in Cardoza-Fonseca, 
courts need not defer to the BIA’s interpretation.177 
 Additionally, a BIA opinion does not warrant Chevron deference if 
the interpretation advocated by the BIA clashes with standard princi-
ples of statutory interpretation.178 Under Chevron, when an interpreta-
tion by an agency is unreasonable, a court does not owe it any defer-
ence.179 An agency interpretation is not reasonable when it ignores an 
                                                                                                                      
171 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 445. 
172 See id. at 449. 
173 See id. at 446. 
174 See 533 U.S. at 298. 
175 See id.; Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449. 
176 See 480 U.S. at 449. 
177 See id.; see also John S. Kane, Refining Chevron—Restoring Judicial Review to Protect Re-
ligious Refugees, 60 Admin. L. Rev. 513, 591 (2008) (arguing that Congress should amend 
the Refugee Act, but rather than waiting for this change, the Supreme Court should re-
evaluate the application of Chevron to certain immigration cases, because “the dangerous 
mood of near complete judicial acquiescence to the BIA must change”). 
178 See Delgado, 563 F.3d at 882–83 (Berzon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
179 See 467 U.S. at 844. 
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established rule of statutory construction set forth by the Supreme 
Court.180 Here, if one agrees that the interpretation advocated by the 
BIA does indeed deny the standards of statutory interpretation, then it 
is not owed any deference by a court.181 
 The BIA’s reason for its decision is also determinative of whether 
or not it is owed deference.182 In N-A-M- the BIA declared that its deci-
sion was compelled by a “plain reading of the Act” suggesting that the 
BIA did not think that it was offering its own reasonable interpretation 
of an ambiguous statute.183 If the BIA was not attempting to fill a gap 
left by Congress, then it was not exercising the general authority of an 
agency to resolve statutory ambiguities.184 
 Finally, it must also be noted that the touchstone of Chevron defer-
ence is a congressional intent to leave a particular issue to the agency.185 
Some authorities have rightly doubted that Congress meant to give the 
BIA discretion to abrogate U.S. treaty obligations by expanding the par-
ticularly serious crimes exception beyond the limits imposed by those 
obligations.186 Such an interpretation would conflict with the extensive 
efforts of Congress to comport with its obligations under the Conven-
tion and Protocol.187 
2. The Language of the Statute Does Not Indicate an Intent to Give the 
Attorney General Unfettered, Unreviewable Discretion 
 The only way that one can agree that the Attorney General has 
complete, unreviewable discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(B)(ii) 
is to look at a few lines of the statute in isolation.188 Courts did just that 
in 2006, in Ali v. Achim, and in 2009, in Delgado v. Holder, where the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits ruled that the 
definition of a particularly serious crime was completely within the At-
torney General’s discretion.189 The more expansive view, which is re-
                                                                                                                      
180 See Bell v. Reno, 218 F.3d 86, 94 (2d Cir. 2000). 
181 See Delgado, 563 F.3d at 882–83 (Berzon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
182 See id. at 883. 
183 See id. (quoting In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 338 (B.I.A. 2007)). 
184 Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 471 F.3d 1350, 1354 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding that deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute is inappro-
priate if the agency mistakenly believes that the interpretation is compelled by Congress). 
185 See 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
186 See Brief of International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 19, 
Ali, 128 S. Ct. 828 (No. 06-1346). 
187 See id. at 19–20. 
188 See Nethagani, 532 F.3d at 154–55; Alaka, 456 F.3d at 96–98. 
189 See Delgado, 563 F.3d at 869; Ali, 468 F.3d at 470. 
2009] The Particularly Serious Crime Exception to Withholding of Removal 233 
quired by norms of statutory construction, shows that the intent of 
these phrases was in fact to limit the discretion of the Attorney Gen-
eral.190 In 2006, this broader examination of the statute led the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to the proper interpretation in 
Alaka v. Attorney General.191 Because the Alaka court looked at the entire 
subchapter of the INA in which 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(B)(ii) appears 
and not just two lines in isolation, it recognized that the delegation of 
power to “decide” and “determine” was in fact a limitation, when com-
pared with the thirty-two other instances where “discretion” was 
granted.192 The Alaka court rightly emphasized that jurisdiction was not 
stripped in all instances where IJs were entitled to make a decision, only 
in those instances where Congress had taken the extra step of specify-
ing that the sole authority for the action was in the IJs’ discretion.193 
 In 2008 in Nethagani v. Mukasey, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit similarly found that the language of the statute was not 
meant to put IJ decisions beyond the scope of review by appellate 
courts.194 As in Alaka, the Nethagani court drew a distinction between IJ 
decisions that require the exercise of routine discretion and decisions 
which the text of the statute specifies as being in the discretion of the 
IJ.195 The court examined cases where it had previously ruled that it did 
not have jurisdiction to review IJ decisions, and the court found that in 
each instance the statute in question had specifically characterized the 
act as discretionary.196 
                                                                                                                      
190 Nethagani, 532 F.3d at 154–55; Alaka, 456 F.3d at 96–98; Soltane v. U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, 381 F.3d 143, 147–48 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 
(1962). 
191 See 456 F.3d at 97–98. 
192 See id. 
193 See id.; see also Daniel Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The Real ID Act, Discretion, 
and the “Rule” of Immigration Law, 51 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 161, 198 (2008) (arguing that be-
cause “[t]he scope of judicial review can . . . be understood on a continuum ranging from 
the most deferential review of delegated discretion to the closest scrutiny of legal interpre-
tive discretion . . . a less deferential scope of judicial review is both theoretically sound and 
most likely to lead to fair and consistent results”); Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing 
in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1615, 1630 (2000) 
(arguing that judicial review in immigration cases is desirable because of the actual and 
perceived independence it brings to an issue of extreme stakes, its benefit in public rela-
tions, the generalist perspective brought by judges from their courts of general jurisdiction 
(as opposed to the narrow specialty of IJs), and because the possibility of judicial review 
encourages more thoughtful and rational decision-making on the part of administrative 
adjudicators). 
194 See 532 F.3d at 154. 
195 See id. 
196 See id. (citing Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 98 n.7 (2d Cir. 2007); Atsilov v. Gonza-
les, 468 F.3d 112, 116–17 (2d Cir. 2006); Jun Min Zhang v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 172, 175–76 
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 Thus, it is only when a court does a narrow and superficial review 
that it finds discretion to be solely within the Attorney General’s pow-
er.197 When courts venture into a deeper and more exacting review, 
they rightly reach the conclusion that they do indeed possess jurisdic-
tion to review 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(B)(ii) decisions.198 This broader 
view is not simply desirable, but required by the canons of statutory 
construction.199 
B. The Circuit Split Should Be Resolved So That Only Aggravated Felonies Can 
Be Particularly Serious Crimes and Courts Can Exercise Appellate  
Review of Particularly Serious Crime Rulings 
 Both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have held that IJs have the 
discretion to declare non-aggravated felonies as particularly serious 
crimes.200 In reaching this conclusion, these courts relied heavily on the 
fact that discretion was retained by the Attorney General throughout 
the many amendments to the statute.201 The Ninth Circuit emphasized 
in Delgado that under the INA, which marked the codification of the 
particularly serious crime exception, the BIA was responsible for de-
termining on a case-by-case basis which crimes were particularly seri-
ous.202 Because the statute initially vested discretion in the BIA, the 
Ninth Circuit held that none of the subsequent amendments to the 
INA were meant to divest the Attorney General of his power.203 It fur-
ther concluded that the designation of some felonies as per se particu-
larly serious in the Immigration Act of 1990 did not suggest an intent to 
strip the Attorney General of the authority to determine that other 
crimes were also particularly serious.204 The court found support for 
                                                                                                                      
(2d Cir. 2006); Avendano-Espejo v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 503, 505 (2d Cir. 
2006); Saloum v. U.S. Citizenship & Immig. Servs., 437 F.3d 238, 242–43 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
197 See Nethagani, 532 F.3d at 154; Alaka, 456 F.3d at 96–98. 
198 See Nethagani, 532 F.3d at 154; Alaka, 456 F.3d at 97–98. 
199 See Richards, 369 U.S. at 11. 
200 See Delgado, 563 F.3d at 872; Ali, 468 F.3d at 469. 
201 See Delgado, 563 F.3d at 869; Ali, 468 F.3d at 469. 
202 See 563 F.3d at 868 (citing In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (B.I.A. 1982)). 
203 See id. at 869. 
204 See id. at 868. The court did recognize that the relaxation of the per se bar in 1996 
under the AEDPA and again under the IIRIRA was probably done in order to avoid sweep-
ing minor crimes, crimes that had not explicitly been defined as aggravated felonies, into 
the categorical bar. See id. at 869. It maintained, however, that neither the creation of this 
initial bar, nor its subsequent relaxation showed a congressional intent to eliminate the 
Attorney General’s pre-existing discretion to declare a crime particularly serious, whether 
or not it was an aggravated felony. See id. 
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this stance in the fact that after the 1990 amendment, the BIA contin-
ued to apply its particularly serious crime test to non-aggravated felo-
nies and find that they were particularly serious.205 The Delgado court 
also noted that the Second Circuit had ruled in a 1995 decision that the 
BIA had the power to make such discretionary decisions.206 
 Critically, however, these decisions ignore the origins of the duty of 
non-refoulement and the particularly serious crimes exception to which it 
gives way.207 In Cardoza-Fonseca, the U.S. Supreme Court, in determining 
what standard of proof an alien must meet to show that he has a “well-
founded fear of persecution,” found that the INA drew its language 
directly from the Convention.208 The Court found that Congress had 
adopted the language of the Convention with the goal of enacting the 
Convention’s intent and spirit.209 As has already been noted, the intent 
of the Convention was for the particularly serious crimes exception to 
be viewed narrowly.210 This is evidenced by the absence of any excep-
tion in the earliest drafts, and the commentary on the proposed excep-
tion, specifically describing it as a narrow one, intended only to protect 
the national security of the state.211 
 Thus, in Delgado, Judge Berzon, in a partial concurrence and par-
tial dissent, focused on the origin of the particularly serious crime ex-
ception in the Convention and thus rightly argued that the current 
statute is most sensibly understood as still another attempt to imple-
ment the particularly serious crime exception in a manner that con-
                                                                                                                      
205 See, e.g., In re B-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 427, 430 (B.I.A. 1991). 
206 See 563 F.3d at 868 (citing Ahmetovic v. INS, 62 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
207 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436–37. 
208 See id. 
209 See id. “If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the . . . 1980 Act, it is that 
one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into confor-
mance with the 1968 United Nations Protocol . . . .” Id.; see also Molzof v. United States, 502 
U.S. 301, 307 (1992) (finding that it is a fundamental principle that when Congress adopts 
language from another source where it has an accepted meaning, it is presumed to intend 
that meaning absent direction to the contrary). The Cardoza-Fonseca Court also later high-
lighted its longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation 
statutes in favor of the aliens. See 480 U.S. at 449 (citing INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 
(1966); Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 128 (1964); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 
(1948)). 
210 See Weis, supra note 51, at 325–334. 
211 See id. The duty the United States bound itself to becomes even narrower, if as some 
scholars advocate, the exception “should be considered only where the crimes usually de-
fined as ‘serious’ —for example, rape, homicide, armed robbery, and arson—are commit-
ted with aggravating factors, or at least without significant mitigating circumstances.” James 
C. Hathaway & Colin J. Harvey, Framing Refugee Protection in the New World Disorder, 34 Cor-
nell Int’l L.J. 257, 292 (2001). 
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forms to the Protocol.212 In support of this position, Judge Berzon cited 
instances where Congress openly questioned whether U.S. law con-
formed to the Protocol.213 In retracing the history of the statute, Judge 
Berzon found nothing in the legislative history that suggested a con-
gressional intent to allow IJs to designate any offense as a particularly 
serious crime; if Congress did not regard a crime as sufficiently severe 
to include it in the ever-broadening definition of an aggravated felony, 
then it could not be considered particularly serious.214 The dissent 
rightly argued that such an interpretation would also be in keeping 
with the United States’ well-settled principle of interpreting its interna-
tional agreements broadly and granting expansive rights to those pro-
tected under them.215 Because the origin and original intent of the 
statute are clear, so too should be the duty of courts to apply 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231 (b)(3)(B)(ii) in a restrictive fashion by allowing only aggravated 
                                                                                                                      
212 See 563 F.3d at 884 (Berzon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part g). Immigration 
courts have also recognized that the interpretation of the exception must be understood as 
complying with the Protocol’s standards. See In re L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 645, 652 (1999) (find-
ing that “the reason for [Congress’] . . . different approach” in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(B) 
and 1231(b)(3)(B) is that “Congress understood that in enacting revised section 241(b)(3) 
[of the INA], it was carrying forth the statutory implementation . . . of our international 
treaty obligations”). 
213 See Delgado, 563 F.3d at 884 (Berzon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(“Senator Kennedy explained that, ‘[T]o declare an aggravated felon anyone convicted of 
an offense involving imprisonment of one year, . . . means that people with fairly minor 
offenses would be ineligible to seek withholding of deportation, [which] in many instances 
may violate the Refugee Convention.’” (quoting Mark-up on S. 1664 before the S. Comm.on the 
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 60–61 (1996) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, Member, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary))). 
214 See Delgado, 563 F.3d at 882 (Berzon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see 
also Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19 n.23, Ali v. Achim, 128 S.Ct. 828 (2007) (No. 06-
1346) (“[G]iven the over-breadth of the aggravated felony definition, it is difficult for 
UNHCR to conceive of a crime outside that category as one that is particularly serious.”). 
215 Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924) (finding that international 
agreements are to “be construed in a broad and liberal spirit” and that “when two con-
structions are possible, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under [them] and the 
other favorable to [those rights], the latter is to be preferred); accord United States v. Stu-
art, 489 U.S. 353, 368 (1989); A.H. Philips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (find-
ing that an exemption from “humanitarian and remedial legislation must therefore be 
narrowly construed, giving due regard to the plain meaning of statutory language and the 
intent of Congress”). This stance is also appropriate in keeping with the Cardoza-Fonseca 
Court’s observation that “[d]eportation is always a harsh measure; it is all the more replete 
with danger when the alien makes a claim that he or she will be subject to death or perse-
cution if forced to return to his or her home country.” See 480 U.S. at 449. Such a recogni-
tion is grounds for constraining, not expanding the group of individuals who should face 
this treatment, particularly through the discretion of one individual. See id. 
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felonies to be declared particularly serious and exercising judicial re-
view to ensure that the BIA properly applies this standard.216 
C. The Dual Requirement That Individuals Have Committed a Particularly 
Serious Crime and Pose a Continuing Danger to the Community 
 Resolving the circuit split in the above fashion will make substan-
tial progress towards reinstating the United States’ obligations under 
the Convention.217 Even with these two issues resolved, however, the 
United States will not have guaranteed that it has met its international 
treaty obligations.218 This section argues that to bring U.S. law into con-
formance with international obligations, a new step will have to be in-
troduced into the process, namely the requirement that aliens be 
found not only to have committed a particularly serious crime, but also 
to pose an ongoing danger to the community before they are declared 
ineligible for withholding of removal.219 
 In 1986, in In re Carabelle, the BIA found that a two-part inquiry was 
unnecessary, as the question of whether or not an alien subject to de-
portation had committed a particularly serious crime answered the 
question of whether he or she posed a danger to the community.220 The 
applicant was a Cuban citizen who had departed Cuba as part of the 
Mariel boatlift in 1980.221 He pled guilty and was convicted in 1983 to a 
number of charges stemming from a robbery.222 The IJ found that he 
was ineligible for withholding of removal because of his crime and re-
jected his contention that despite his crime being particularly serious, a 
further showing that he constituted a danger to the community was 
needed before he could be denied withholding of removal.223 
 Such an interpretation is incorrect, however, as the Convention 
intended that an individual’s current danger to the community be a 
separate and distinct question from whether he had already committed 
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a particularly serious crime.224 Basic logic also argues that the commis-
sion of a particularly serious crime in the past is not in and of itself an 
indication of a threat to the community in the present or future.225 It is 
particularly important to give effect to the second clause when Con-
gress’s categorical approach included crimes such as tax evasion and 
trafficking in vehicles with altered identification numbers in the aggra-
vated felony category; these are crimes that do not inherently indicate 
the offender’s danger to the community, much less a danger so grave as 
to justify exceptions to the United States’ statutory and treaty require-
ment of non-refoulement.226 Ignoring the second prong of the require-
ment also violates the “cardinal principle of statutory construction,” 
namely to give effect to every clause and part of a statute.227 
 Though every circuit that has considered the issue has deferred to 
the BIA’s interpretation,228 the alternative interpretation actually fol-
lows from the intent of the Convention, is endorsed by leading com-
mentators on the issue, and is endorsed by other signatory nations to 
the Convention.229 Though this would mark a significant departure 
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from the current interpretation used by the BIA, implementation of 
this alternative interpretation is necessary to comply with the Conven-
tion’s stated goal of “assur[ing] refugees the widest possible exercise of 
these fundamental rights and freedoms.”230 
 As has been previously discussed, non-refoulement has come to be 
recognized as “the cornerstone of international refugee law.”231 When 
it was first created, the particularly serious crime exception to this pol-
icy was meant to be read narrowly as evidenced by the original draft, 
wherein there was no exception to refoulement at all.232 Though excep-
tions were ultimately made to this non-refoulement policy, they were only 
accepted in order to allow states to safeguard their security.233 Thus, it 
was the potential “danger to the community” and not the criminal con-
viction alone that was meant to activate the exception.234 The BIA’s dis-
regard of this language limiting access to a statutory grant of relief con-
travenes the policy of the U.S. Supreme Court, which “usually read[s] 
[an] exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of 
the [policy].”235 As an exception to the Act’s general and strongly ex-
pressed rule of non-refoulement, the particularly serious crimes exception 
should be construed narrowly.236 
 Congress’s use of the exact words of the Convention as well as its 
stated intent to conform U.S. law to the Convention establish that the 
exception must be read to be consistent with the international under-
standing of the operative language.237 Even without this language and 
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the legislative history, a later enactment of Congress would not be pre-
sumed, absent a clear statement, to abrogate the United States’ treaty 
obligations, such as its obligations under the Protocol.238 As a matter of 
U.S. law, “the opinions of . . . sister signatories [are] entitled to consid-
erable weight.”239 It is thus essential to consider the interpretation of 
other signatory countries to the Convention.240 This is clearly not some-
thing U.S. courts have done to date, as other signatory nations rou-
tinely treat the question of a refugee’s potential danger to the commu-
nity as a distinct inquiry under the Convention.241 
Conclusion 
 One must not lose sight of the fact that in order for 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231 (b)(3)(B)(ii) to be activated, it must first be established that the 
individual is facing return to a country where he is likely to face perse-
cution. As such, the exception to the non-refoulement policy was meant to 
be an extremely narrow one. Although legislative reforms over the 
years did expand the number of crimes defined as aggravated felonies 
and thus particularly serious crimes, such reforms were not intended to 
unduly expand this narrow exception. Indeed, the expansion of the 
per se category of particularly serious crimes only makes sense if only 
these crimes can be particularly serious and if the satisfaction of this 
requirement is viewed as only the first step in a two-step process. Once 
it has been established that an individual committed a particularly seri-
                                                                                                                      
238 See Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1983) (“‘A treaty 
will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such pur-
pose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed.’” (quoting Cook v. United States, 
288 U.S. 102, 120 (1930))); see also Washington v. Wash. Commercial Passenger Fishing 
Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 
U.S. 404, 412–13 (1968); Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, 
Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934). 
239 See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985) (quoting Benjamins v. British Euro-
pean Airways, 572 F.2d 919 (1978)). 
240 See id. 
241 See, e.g., Pushpanathan v. Minister of Citizenship & Immig., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, 999 
(Can.). The Canadian Supreme Court ruled that after finding that a refugee has commit-
ted a particularly serious crime, the government must still “make the added determination 
that the person poses a danger to the safety of the public or to the security of the country.” 
See id. In Austria, an administrative court overturned the deportation of a refugee who had 
committed a particularly serious crime because the conviction had “only evidential rele-
vance; it could not be deduced therefrom that, ipso facto, the applicant constituted a dan-
ger to Austrian society within the meaning of Article 33(2).” Ahmed v. Austria, App. No. 
35964/94, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 278, 281 (1996). The ruling was subsequently overtuned 
when it was held that the refugee did, in fact, constitute a future danger to society. See id. at 
282. 
2009] The Particularly Serious Crime Exception to Withholding of Removal 241 
ous crime, it is still necessary to show that he poses an ongoing danger 
to the community before the exception is activated. This was the intent 
of the Convention as shown in its legislative history and interpreted by 
other courts around the globe. 
 By collapsing this two pronged test into one question and granting 
the Attorney General discretion to declare any crime particularly seri-
ous, the BIA has overextended what was meant to be a narrow excep-
tion. If a crime is not sufficiently grave to be an aggravated felony, it 
cannot be a particularly serious crime. Review by appellate courts is also 
necessary to ensure that the BIA properly applies the definition of a 
particularly serious crime. The BIA, and the appellate courts on review, 
must also find that an individual who has committed a particularly seri-
ous crime is a danger to the community before an exception to the non-
refoulement policy is appropriate. Only with these steps in place can we 
feel confident that we are not too hastily sending individuals back to 
countries where they are likely to face persecution. 
 To return to the example of Mrs. Alaka, she was clearly not a 
blameless party as she had been a participant in fraud in the United 
States, her adopted home. But to deport her to a country where the IJ 
openly acknowledged she would likely face persecution would not have 
been a commensurate punishment for a non-violent crime that carried 
a relatively light punishment, and where she did not pose an ongoing 
danger to the community. The reforms discussed herein will assure that 
only the most serious criminals who pose a danger to a community will 
be sent back to environments where they are likely to face persecution. 
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